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This paper describes a simulation model of a small open economy, which includes a careful 
specification of imperfect competition in the goods market and the possibility of increasing 
returns to scale of goods production. The response of the model to shocks is investigated on 
the assumption that the policy authorities seek to control inflation by means of a fixed nominal 
exchange rate target and to maintain zero net external debt by means of a simple fiscal policy 
rule. The influence of economies of scale on the pattern of response to shocks is investigated.
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The development of models of imperfect competition (Hart, 1982, Weitzman, 1982, Meade, 
1986, Pagano, 1990) has led to a new interest in the importance of economies of scale. 
However, these studies have typically been algebraic models which, while often complete in 
their own terms, typically do not represent all the interactions believed to be important in the 
macroeconomy. As a consequence it is difficult to use such models to quantify the importance 
of economies of scale and to identify the extent to which they differ in practice from those with 
constant returns.
In this paper we set out a simulation model of an open economy with economies 
of scale, in order to investigate this issue. It has two distinctive characteristics:
(i) a framework of imperfect competition between firms. As firms enter (or exit) 
production, depending on the earnings yield and the cost of capital, the profit 
mark-up is revised. As Layard and Nickell (1985) note, a lower mark-up during 
a demand boom shifts the labour demand outwards and generates a rise in 
output. With new investment to face the rising production requirements, the 
capital stock increases and this causes further changes to the composition of 
wealth and to the demand for other assets.
(ii) a production function with possibly increasing returns to scale, so that labour 
and capital productivity rise with rising activity.
This allows us to investigate the importance of economies of scale as the economy responds to 
exogenous disturbances.
The model is too complex for analytic solution, although an analytic investigation of its 
steady-state properties is possible. We therefore simulate our theoretical model using parameter 
values relevant to a small open economy such as Britain’s.
As with any model, the response to disturbances cannot be considered independently 
of the framework of macroeconomic policy. We adopt a structure which is intended to mimic 
the behaviour of a country in a fixed nominal exchange rate system, but which, like Britain, is 
explicitly concerned about the current account on its balance of payments. Accordingly, we 
assume that the authorities seek to keep the exchange rate close to its fixed target by means 
of intervention in the foreign exchanges. However reserves are limited, and the interest rate 




























































































policy is set with reference to the country’s net foreign asset position.1 In this paper, we assume 
that government spending is set by long-run considerations about the desirability of public 
spending, so that fiscal policy is then represented by variations in the tax rate.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the equations of the 
model and the values that were imposed on the parameters. Section 3 presents the steady- 
state solution and examines the links between target choices, instrument levels and consistent 
equilibrium values for real exchange rates. Section 4 describes the details of the fiscal policy 
and monetary policy and then presents simulations of the model by looking at the behaviour 
of the main economic variables. Finally Section 5 concludes with possible applications of, and 
extensions to, the present model.
2. The Model
2.1 Main Features
This section describes the model in detail. It is intended to provide a complete 
description of a small open economy; its imposed coefficients take values typical of those 
observed for the UK. Consistent stock-flow accounts are kept2 and the effects of valuation 
changes on wealth are recorded. These are driven by exchange rate changes (which satisfy 
capital market equilibrium conditions) and by an arbitrage model of the valuation of securities 
on the stock exchange (the valuation ratio).
Expectations of future exchange rate changes are forward-looking but the exchange rate 
is nevertheless stabilised by official intervention. The valuation ratio, Tobin’s Q, is treated as 
a forward-looking variable which is free to react to unanticipated shocks or policy 
announcements on the assumption of model-consistent expectations (perfect foresight). It 
influences the economy not only by leading to capital gains and losses which influence wealth 
and thus consumption, but also as a determinant of new investment. This provides a channel 
for interest rate effects quite different from that found in most macroeconomic models.3
1 We are, of course, aware that every country in the world cannot achieve independently- 
chosen values for net foreign assets. But we are modelling a small country, taking the rest of 
the world as given.
2 The importance of this is stressed by Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Whittaker, Wren- 
Lewis, Blackburn and Currie (1986), following from the work of Blinder and Solow (1973).
3 In the UK Treasury model, for example, interest rates exert their main influence by their 




























































































A novel feature of the model is that we introduce a coherent framework of imperfect 
competition. The mark-up depends on the number of firms as described by Meade (1986); 
this number in turn rises or falls as the valuation ration exceeds or is below its equilibrium 
value of 1. With the valuation ratio satisfying and arbitrage equation, the implication of this
PS'.
is that the number of firms rises or falls depending on whether expected profits per unit of 
capital, discounted at the expected interest rate, exceed or are below the unit price of capital. 
Such a model can be accommodated in a situation in which the production function of each 
firm reflects increasing returns to scale.
Finally, we assume that there is no single natural rate of unemployment, but that real 
wages rise in response to a fall in unemployment and fall in response to a rise in 
unemployment, as described by Lawson (1982). Such a model, then accommodates the hysteresis 
effects noted by Budd, Levine and Smith (1988). However, we show that it can in fact be 
integrated to give a conventional model with a rising labour supply curve.
We now set out our notation and the equations of the model. The theory underlying 






t gives value of variable during t**1 quarter. 
o° gives steady-state value of variable.
Absence of subscript marks a constant term, or equilibrium.
money value of variable in domestic currency 
$ money value of variable in foreign currency.
* target value of variable 
-  base line value of variable
F foreign term corresponding to similar domestic term.
P private-sector variable 
G government sector variable 
X export term 
M import term































































































































Variables other than the money price variables (P, Px, P“, W), the ratios (R, RF, Z, E, Q),
the amount of foreign imports (M), and the number of firms (N) are all valued in terms of the 
domestic product (i.e. with money values deflated by the domestic price level P) unless they 
have the superscript or $ .
Greek characters represent constant parameter values unless otherwise stated. Lower 
case Roman characters will be used occasionally to express variables measured per firm (i.e. the 
aggregates divided by N). The following variables are defined:
List of Variables
Name Definition Baseline Value
Stock of Bonds 0
Budget Deficit 0
Private Sector Consumption 60
Government Expenditure 14
Stock of Money 25
Exchange Rate 




Total Stock of Foreign Wealth 0
Stock of Reserves 0
Private Sector Stock of Foreign Wealth 0
Gross Investment 6
Balance of International Payments on 
Current Account
0
Real Capital Stock 1000
Employment 100
Imports 20
Number of Firms 1000
General Price Level 1




Import Price of Raw Materials, in 
Foreign Currency
1
Capital Valuation Ratio 1
Domestic Interest Rates 0.02 (= S
Foreign Interest Rates 0.02 (= g
Payroll Tax Rate 0.35
Trade Balance 0
National Debt 25
Total Private Wealth 1025
Nominal Wage Rate, Net of tax 0.40
Exports 20
Domestic Output 100
Volume of Foreign Demand 100




























































































Table 2.2 The Equations
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( 2 4 b )
<t+ l, t
Q* "
j  + Rt 
pt /p t - i
2.3 The Model Specified
Demand and Supply
The consumption function shows spending out of private wealth and labour income (equation 
1). It represents life-cycle behaviour when current labour income is taken as representative of 
future labour income. Equations 2 and 3 show trade flows. Export demand is seen as price- 
sensitive,4 adjusted with a lagged response so as to produce a J-curve. Imports on the other 
hand are treated as being confined to raw materials. The quantity of the material (M), which 
is needed to produce one unit of the finished domestic product (Y) is technically fixed at 02 
(equation 3). Equation (4a) is a neoclassical Cobb-Douglas production function for each firm. 
Value added per firm (Y - M)/N is determined by the capital and labour inputs used by the 
firm. All firms use the same technology with no exogenous technological progress. Technical 
coefficients are fixed and such that 7t + 72 > 1 ensuring increasing returns to scale, while the 
constant 70 is used for scaling the numerical values. Having assumed that material inputs are 
a fixed proportion of the final product, the equation can be used to derive the aggregate 
demand for labour in terms of output, and fixed capital (equation 4b). Equation 4c gives the 
partial adjustment process for employment by each firm.
The trade balance is described by equation 5. Equation (3) is substituted into (5a) to 
give equation (5b).
Domestic goods markets are assumed to be represented by a form of imperfect 
competition. The underlying model is spatial in form. Firms are assumed to be distributed at 
equal intervals round a circle, while consumers represent a continuum on the circle. Firms face 
transport costs in distributing goods to consumers, but their local monopoly power allows them 
to earn excess profits on sales to all except their marginal consumers. The process of 
competition ensures that, in equilibrium, the number of firms adjusts so that, despite the 
opportunities for excess profit afforded by local monopoly, the return on capital is equated to 
the rate of interest. This model is described by Meade (1986).
There are two aspects to investment, represented by equations (6) and (7). Equation
4 We have made the foreign demand for our exports depend upon the prices charged to 
them (P*) and not one the price charged to domestic purchasers (P) and have written an 




























































































(6) represents the fact that, if the average valuation ratio is greater than 1, there is an incentive 
to set up new firms. With quadratic adjustment costs, the rate of change of the number of firms 
will be given by (6) (Hayashi, 1982). But it should be noted that this function relates to average 
Q and the setting up of new firms. It is therefore equally valid with constant or increasing 
returns to scale.5 This mechanism is forward-looking, unlike that described by Pagano (1990). 
He assumes that the number of firms adjusts in response to current profits only.
Secondly, it is assumed that each firm follows a partial adjustment process. Equation (7) 
shows the capital stock per firm adjusting in response to the difference between its previous 
value and the level of capital per firm consistent with profit maximisation at current output and 
interest rate levels. This profit-maximising level of the capital stock can be derived in the 
following way.
First, total costs should equal total revenue:
wL + (R + ij,JK + P^M/E = P (Y -X )  + PxX  (26)
Recalling (3), (5b) and (13) and dividing all terms by the number of firms N we find that for 
each firm with Z the earnings yield on capital and ij>2 the rate of depreciation, the value of 
labour and capital inputs add to nominal value added:
(1 + S)W(LIN) + (ZQ + \pjP(K/N) = P(G/N) (27)
For a given output level per firm (that is YIN = y  = constant) the firm in the long run 
chooses the variable input factors (l=L/N) and (k=KJN) in order to minimise cost. The 
Lagrangian is :
A = (1 + S)Wl + (ZQ + ^ P k  + X{YIN - y }  (28)
with A denoting the shadow cost of one additional unit of output per firm.
By taking first-order conditions we find that the unit prices of input factors should be 
proportional to their marginal products, which are in turn is proportional to the average 






( zq+v>2) p = xa(Y/N) = A72~ I £ ~ (29b)
4 As Hayashi (1982) notes, with a conventional Q-driven investment function there is always 
the problem that marginal Q is relevant while average Q is observed. Our specification, 




























































































Putting (29a and b) into (27) we find that
A(7, + 12)Y = PG
and hence that the shares of total cost paid to factor inputs are given in the long run optimum 
as:
7 1
(1 + S)UI P (C /N ) (30)
72
(ZQ + *t>2 )k (G /N) (31)
Equation (27) is automatically satisfied in equilibrium, as can be checked from the definition 
of the earnings yield in equation (23). Hence when the capital stock reaches the optimal level 
implied by (31), labour demand also reaches its optimal level as implied by (30), because these 
two equations add-up to (27).
In the steady-state the number of firms must be constant. Equation (6) implies that, for 
this to happen, the valuation ratio must be at its steady state value, (Q = 1). But if Q is 
constant, the profit rate must be equal to the rate of interest, by virtue of the arbitrage 
equation (24a). With Z  = R  and Q = 1, (31) gives the target capital stock described in (7) 
towards which firms are gradually adjusting via a simple process.
In this framework firms minimise cost in the long run. In the short run firms may enter 
or exit production according to whether valuation ratio is lower or higher than its equilibrium 
value. Such deviations are in fact indications of differentials between the real rate of interest 
and the profit rate, as can be seen from (24b). In equilibrium these rates are equalised and 
there is no motive for a firm to enter or exit the economy.
Changes in the capital stock are added to depreciation of last period capital stock of 
each firm to give gross investment (8). Gross output (9) is the sum of the components of final 
demand.
Prices and Wages
Equation (10) determines the take-home wage rates. The model which we have used does not 
have a fixed natural rate of unemployment. Instead we have incorporated the idea that people 
who have been unemployed for any length of time drop out of the labour market (Budd, 
Levine and Smith, 1988) and, conversely that, once the unemployed are persuaded to work, they 
become more employable. As a consequence it is the change in unemployment rather than the 




























































































process to represent adaptive expectations in the labour market. The wage equation, 
nevertheless, has the property that it integrates into the form which we would be found if the 
labour market were represented by a situation in which, in the long run, labour supply is 
increasing in the real wage. This is discussed in section 3.
A target price is defined by equation (11a). We prove that this price maximises profits 
when the firm sells in an imperfectly competitive market. In the short run the only variable 
costs per unit of product are wages and raw materials. The cost of capital is part of the fixed 
cost. When a firm produces y units of output, total cost will be given by:
c(y) = c, + cy  (32)
where c, = (1 + S)W(lfy) + p2(P“/E) (33)
Profits per firm are
H = Py - (Cl + cy) (34)
and are maximised when the firm sets production such that:
dnjdy = 0
or after some trivial manipulation:
P( 1 + - ^ - )  = c (35)
dy/y
With output produced by other firms denoted by Y' = Y  - y, and assuming a downwards 
sloping aggregate demand curve of constant elasticity (-e), we can derive the symmetric 
Cournot-Nash solution as:
„ c ,  (1 + S M l/y )  + 0 o(PM/E )
P = ------- -------- = ------------------------------------  (36)
1 -  t / N  1 -  e/N
For large N  we can write the approximation
(1 - dN)-' ~  1 + d N  (37)
as in equation (11a) and interpret the pricing strategy as a mark-up on variable costs as 
described by Meade (1986). The mark-up is inversely proportional to the number of firms. It 
becomes zero under perfect competition (N *+ <o), and maximum when there is monopoly (N 
= 1) or complete collusion among firms. In our model we have assumed that gradual 
adjustment towards this target price level takes place. This is represented in equation (lib). 
Profit margins, in this model move to an equilibrium because, as noted before, if the rate of 
return on capital is greater than the rate of interest, new firms will enter, depressing the rate 
of return through increased competition.
As a result of the assumption that ail imports take the form of raw materials embedded 




























































































between the market price of domestic product and the cost of living (P). Export prices (12) 
are fixed as a weighted average of domestic and prices of competitors in foreign markets.
Real Income (13) is the sum of domestic demand at constant prices plus the real net 
trade balance: Multiplied by the price level (P) this gives gross domestic product at market 
prices (P, G,). To obtain Money GDP at factor cost one has to deduct indirect taxes.
since, in the model it is assumed that all tax is raised as a payroll tax.
The External Sector
The real current balance is derived either in (14) as the sum of the real trade balance and real 
net property income from abroad or in (15a) as the change in foreign wealth at constant prices. 
It is assumed that all foreign borrowing or lending is denominated in foreign currency and that 
foreigners do not own any domestic assets. All foreign assets are assumed to take the form of 
bills on which there are no foreign currency capital gains, though a change in the exchange rate 
will cause a capital gain or loss in terms of the home currency. The stock of total foreign 
assets is obtained in (15b) by adding current balance plus revaluations on the existing stock of 
assets. This equation may be interpreted as the external constraint since it determines the 
changes in foreign assets required to finance a current account deficit or induced by a current 
account surplus.
The total national holding of foreign wealth, (16a), is held either by the government as 
foreign exchange reserves or by the private sector.
The private sector is assumed (17) to have a "target" holding of foreign assets expressed 
as a proportion of its total wealth. The proportion is sensitive to the expected excess yield on 
foreign assets, that is to the interest rate differential adjusted for expected changes in the 
foreign exchange rate. The actual holding adjusts gradually to the target holding according to
A Floating Exchange Rate
Equations (16-18) have implicitly described a fixed exchange rate system in which the 
capital account is cleared by foreign exchange intervention. We now set out how these 
equations could cope with an environment in which there is no intervention, and the exchange 
rate is therefore left to float. In the absence of official intervention (F = 0) foreign exchange 
reserves are adjusted only by revaluation effects:































































































and foreign assets of the private sector are obtained as the accounting residual
<  "  “t  + A
The floating exchange rate is determined in the capital markets in order to clear these changes 
in the portfolio holdings of the private sector. Reversing equation (17c) we obtain for the 
exchange rate:
Ee -  Ft F
E R t
*2X2Vt
^ t ~ l ^ t ~ l  P P
*ix2vt + (1 - V  “FT-  C l  - Ht ( 1 7 d )
and solving for the current period we arrive at exchange rate equation (17d). With perfect 
capital mobility (<t>2 -> ■») the above equation is reduced to the familiar uncovered interest-rate 
parity condition:
( 1 7 e )
A more complicated stock-flow adjustment takes place when official intervention (F) is actively 
used in order to achieve a nominal exchange rate target, as described in more detail in a next 
section. In such a case foreign exchange reserve (HG) are adjusted in each period according 
to the amount of intervention and revaluations on last-period stock (equation 18b). Finally, the 
foreign assets of the private sector (Hp) are determined by the accounting identity (16c), while 
the exchange rate is clearing the market through (17d).
Other Stock-flow Relations
We move now to discuss the remaining stock-flow relations. The current budget deficit (19a) 
is comprised of the primary deficit between expenditure and taxation, plus interest payments 
on issued bonds, less any interest receipts from foreign assets held by the government.6 For 
convenience it is assumed that the deficit is either bond or money financed, so that the 
government budget constraint (19b) is satisfied.
With the stock of money determined by demand, we can obtain the stock of bonds in





























































































each pep'od (19c). The last bracket expression in the right-hand-side of (19c) shows how the 
government can reduce the real stock of bonds through seigniorage and inflation effects. 
Using P and D for the rate of inflation and the real growth rate of the money stock 
respectively, we can obtain the following first-order-approximation:
t-1 -  D + P (39)
In this way both D and P may be interpreted as implicit tax rates levied on the last-period 
stock of real money balances; the above expression represent budget finance by seigniorage.
The government’s net debt (U) is the gross debt held by the domestic private sector less 
the government’s holding of foreign assets. Real private wealth is then (21) the sum of the 
capital stock valued at real stock exchange prices, the net national debt and the nation’s 
external assets. The real demand for currency (22) is taken as depending on wealth, output 
and the nominal interest rate.
The Rate o f Profit
Finally the model is completed by an equation (23) for the rate of return on fixed 
capital. Gross profits are obtained from total revenue G, = G f,  by subtracting imported input 
costs (P"M/E) and labour costs (1 + S)WL gross of the payroll tax payments. After allowing 
for depreciation of capital (i^/f,., ) at replacement cost (P,) we then determine the net rate of 
return (Z) relative to the capital stock at market prices in the previous period. Thus, equation 
(23) is consistent with the accounting framework for factor costs of production described earlier. 
The rate of return is linked to the rate of interest by an arbitrage equation (24) for the 
valuation ratio.
2.4 Parameter Values




























































































Table 2 3 Parameter Values
a i  = 0.850 a2 = 26/V = 0.0253
= 0 .20 P1 = 18  B2 = 0.20 03 = 0.50
7 .  = 0.44227 0 7i  = 0.7425 , 72 = 0.3575 7^ = 0.276
62 = 9/V =0.0087 62 = 2 0 /?  = 0 .2 , 63 = 4/R = 0.5
£ = 0.26N = 260
\ 2 = 0 .65 , A3 = 0.02 A. = 0 .50 , A = 0.804 D
e2 = 0 .1 0 2 1.0
4>1 = 0 4>0 = 1.52
<i1 = 0.15 ii2 = 0.006
The values for 7j and 72 ensure that there are modestly increasing returns to scale; the effect 
of this is investigated in our subsequent simulations. Combined with an annual rate of interest 
of 8%, these values give a ratio of capital stock to annual output of 2.5.
The value of <t>2 corresponds to a value we had estimated for the U.K. in such an 
equation. It does however, result in capital being rather immobile, and in future use of this 
model we consider there to be a strong case for experimenting with a higher value.
3. The Steady State
The full properties of a model of this type have to be investigated by means of dynamic 
simulation; an analytic solution is not possible. However a useful insight into the policy options 
available in an economy such as this can be given by a steady-state solution. This can be 




























































































Table 3.1 The Steady State Solution
P
C = a pL + a  V a )
1 2
, FX =  ( B Y  - &  )  +  13 T ( 2 )
0 1  1
M  = /3 Y (3)
7 7 ( l  + 1  ~ 1 )






( y  + y  ) ( R  + xp )
1 2  2
I  = M,K
P G
Y = C + C + 1 + X
W = pP
t
P = (L /L ) P0
6 , s L
1 = 1 + ~ O  + S)P -  + (3 MT
N Y 2
( 5 )  '
( 6 )  '
( 7 )  '
( 8 )  ’
(9 ) '
( 10 a )
(10b)
( 1 1 ) '
XP_
P P3 + (1 V r 1 -  (1 03)r
( 1 2 ) ’
P G  PG = C + C + I + — (X - htM) 
P
F
J -  T + R H
(1 3 ) '




























































































J  = 0 (1 5 ) '
P  G 
H =  H  +  H ( 1 6 ) '
P  F  
H =  {<t>̂  -  (fi^CR ~  R ) } V ( 1 7 ) '
onit, ( 1 8 ) '
G F  G 
S p L  = C + RA -  R H ( 1 9 ) '
G
U  = A  + D -  H ( 2 0 ) '
V  =  H +  U + QK ( 2 1 ) '
D =  6 V  +  6 Y - 6 R 
1 2  3
( 2 2 ) '
G -  ( l + S ) p L  -  <J> K
z  = ------------------------------------------
QK
( 2 3 ) '
R =  Z ( 2 6 ) '
In the above expressions p gives the real wage rate (W/P). Equation (10b)', which links this 
to the level of employment is derived by integrating equation (10) and introducing L 0 as the 
constant of integration, r represents competitiveness FIEF*, i.e. the inverse of the real 
exchange rate, p is the ratio PU/PF, i.e. of the price of imported inputs to that of finished 
foreign goods. This exogenous ratio, «, is useful in order to distinguish various types of shocks, 
and in particular to distinguish the effect of an increase in the price of imported inputs from 
that of a general rise in foreign prices.
Equation (1)' to (24)' can be helpfully rearranged into three groups as follows: In the 
first group with barred values are variables whose steady-state values do not explicitly involve 
the policy variables (R, S, E). They are end-period constraints on some flow variables (B, J. 
F), express ratios to output that are constant in the long run, and give the equilibrium value 
for Tobin’s Q. The second group consists of eleven equations that can be solved to determine 
the eleven variables G, K, L, Y, N, H°, HF, A, V, r and p in terms of the two policy instruments 




























































































then be used to "look up” the values of the remaining variables in terms of the policy 
instruments (R, S) and the variables of the second group.
Table 3.2 The Steady State in Three Groups
Group I: Flow Constraints and Constant Ratios
Derived from 
Equation:-
( 1 5 ) J  = 0 ( 1 . 1 )
( 1 8 ) F = 0 ( 1 . 2 )
( 1 9 ) B = 0 ( 1 . 3 )
( 6 ) Q = l ( 1 . 4 )
( 3 ) H = B Y ( 1 . 5 )
( 8 ) I  = 0 K 
2
( 1 . 6 )
Derived from
Group II: Other Behavioural Relationships
1 -  ( 1 - 0  ) r
( 2 ) ' , ( 3 ) ' , ( 1 2 ) ' ,  0 / +  0 ( r - 1 )  -  p0 tY = -R H -------------------- ( I I . 1)
( 1 4 ) ' , ( 1 5 ) ’ j
(31) 7 + 7  1 2
G
R + 0
( I I . 2)
2
(30) 7 + 7  1 2 p(1+S)
( I I . 3)
( l - 0 3 ) ( r - l )  p
( 2 ) ' ,  ( 3 ) ' ,  ( 1 3 ) '  G = ( l - ( d r ) Y  + ------------------------ (0  Y - 0  + 0  r )  ( I I . 4)
1 -  ( l - 0 3 ) r
(19) '
(21) ' , ( 22) '
G F G 
SpL -  C + R H
( 1-5  )V = A + H -  H + 5 Y - 6 R + K  
1 2 3
G F

































































































1 = i  + ---------------------+ H0 T2
N 7 + 7  Y
1 2
( 1 6 ) ' , ( 1 7 ) , H -  H . F.<t> -  0 (R -  R )
V 1 2
- ( 7  +7 -1 )  7 + 7  
7  1 2  1 2  
,  I N  G 
(1+S) = 7 ' ------------------------------------------
( I I . 9)
( 4 ) ' ,  ( 30) ( I I . 10)
7  7
, s 2 1 
(R + 0^)  p Y
7 7
where 7 7  7 
* _ 0 1 2
0 7 + 7  
(1 - /32 ) ( 7 i  + 72 )
S
P= p o( L/Lq )
= 0 .2762




P = ----- ( I I I . l )
E r
( 1 0 a ) ' W = pP ( I I I . 2 )
0 P
( 1 2 ) ' p = ---------------------- - ( I I I . 3 )
1 -  (1~P3 )T
( 1 6 ) '
P G 
H = H -  H ( I I I . 6)
( U ) '  , ( 1 5 )
F
' T = -R H ( I I I . 5 )
( 2 ) ' X = p /  + P ^ T - 1 ) ( I I I . 6 )
( 1 ) '
P
C = a^pL  + a V ( I I I . 7)
( 2 2 ) ' D = 8 V  + 6 Y - 8 R  
1 2  3




























































































(1 6 )’ ,(2 0 ) ' ( I I I . 9 )
(2 6 ) '
G
U = A -  H + 6 V  + 6 Y - 6 R  1 2 3
Z = R ( I I I . 10)
Let us first briefly comment on Group I. Equation (1.1) ensures long-run stabilisation 
of total foreign assets (H) so that the external positions of the country is sustainable. Equation
(1.2) implies a steady-state for official exchange reserves (H°),and this in turn leads to a stable 
level of private foreign assets (Hr). In (1.3) zero long-run deficits guarantee that domestic debt 
of the government is finite. With output and capital stock stabilised in the goods market, it 
follows that all individual components of private sector wealth (V) are stable.
Equation (1.4) rules out a permanent discrepancy between the market value and the 
replacement cost of capital goods. It also ensures that the number of firms stops changing in 
the long run. The last two equations (1.5) and (1.6) give imports and steady-state investment 
as fixed proportions of gross output and capital stock respectively.
In Group II there are eleven equations with nine endogenous variables (p, r, Y, G, K, 
L, A, V  and N), five exogenous variables (Y7, P", PF, RF and C°) and four policy variables (H, 
H°, R, 5). If the authorities fix the interest rate, R and the tax rate S exogenously, the stock 
variables (H, H°) become endogenous and together with the other eight unknowns can be 
determined by the equations available. It should be noted that these variables are defined in 
real terms. This real solution is homogeneous of degree zero in P. But equation (III. 1) means 
that, for given values of r and PF the selection of a particular nominal exchange rate defines 
the price level, or vice versa.
In this paper however, we choose to specify a policy framework in which the authorities 
use fiscal and monetary policy in order to achieve predetermined targets for total national assets 
(//*) held abroad, and foreign exchange reserves (Hc‘). During dynamic adjustment the policy 
authorities aim to keep the nominal exchange rate close to a specified target, with the 
consequence that the steady-state price level is also determined.
Independently of this nominal exchange rate target, and assuming that in the long run 
the other two targets are actually achieved7, so that H = t f  and H° = H °\ the system of
7 There is no loss of generality in assuming asymptotic attainment of targets, because they 
can be achieved by appropriate policy rules. This remains true if the target values are chosen 




























































































equations in Group II can be now used to determine the asymptotic values to which the policy 
instruments, R  and S, should be set. The particular structure of rules by which these targets 
are reached is described in section 4.1.
The policy framework is completed by specifying the way in which the exchange rate 
(£) is determined. Following the discussion in Section 2, we adopt a nominal exchange rate 
target (£*) to which actual rate (E) is kept close by means of intervention (F). In the steady- 
state the target is achieved (E=E*) and intervention ceases (F=0). As noted above, this then 
determines the steady-state price level.
The above policies operate in an economy in which real wages respond only to 
unemployment, so that nominal exchange targets will come under severe stress, when adverse 
demand and supply shocks are considered.
Having specified the policy regime, we move now to discuss the equations of Group- 
11, and the way in which key variables are determined.
3.2 Determination of Competitiveness and Output
Equation (II. 1) is derived by substituting trade flows, the ratio P*IP and foreign interest 
payments in (14') and 15'). For a given target, H*, this equation implies the value of 
competitiveness ( t ) and the level of gross output which are consistent with zero steady-state 
balance of payments. Solving for output we obtain
(3nYF -  0,  + RFH/(3. 0.  -  ( l - 0 , ) R FH//3,
Y = —----------- --------------- - + - i -------------- -----------—  (40)
U02 t
This may be interpreted as the external constraint on output.
Its locus is shown by the downwards sloping curve (jj) in Figure 1. With a fall in world 
demand, 5") it shifts leftwards to j  ' j ' ,  so that, at the same level of competitiveness, lower 
output is required in order to reduce imports and bring the trade deficit to offset the 
unchanged property income flow (RFET).
In order to avoid the fall in output the authorities could raise the long-run foreign 
wealth target (H *) so that increased interest payments compensate for trade losses and current 
balance is restored. This can be done, for example, by a real appreciation of the currency that 
attracts foreign capital, though at the cost of deteriorating competitiveness (point r2).




























































































finished goods may be seen as a rise in the 
ratio 11 = PM/PF. Locus jj moves again 
leftwards, but now it also becomes flatter 
because the slope, 3)73 r, decreases in 
absolute terms.
The other relationships between 
output and competitiveness may be obtained 
by substituting K, L, A  and V  from (II.2) to 
(II.6) into equations (IX.7) and reformulating 
it as another (y,r) locus. Of those 
equations, (II.6) is the definitional identity of 
wealth, (II.4) is the definition of real income,
(11.2) and II.3) are derived from the 
optimising behaviour of producers according 
to Section 2, and (II.7) gives the equality between total supply and demand.
The remaining equation (II.5) gives the stock of interest-bearing debt (A) which is 
compatible with the budget constraint equations (18)’ and (1.3). This stock affects private 
wealth, private consumption and, thus, output which in turn is the determinant of employment, 
taxation and finally of the steady-state debt. Hence, in figure 2, the (bb) locus, derived from
(11.2) to II.7) may be seen as giving the levels of output and competitiveness which are 
compatible with the government budget constraint, and the production decisions by the firms.
To avoid unduly complicated expressions we can simplify the equations by assuming that 
the country is a price-setter, so that /33=1 and the second term in the right-hand side of (II.4) 
vanishes. By setting 60 = l/( 1 -51), we obtain after rearranging (II.7)
Figure 1 The External Constraint:
Competitiveness and Output
( a 26Q -  RF ) H + a 26Q(RF/ R - l )  HG 
Y = --------------------------------------------------------
( i  -  b2ut) ( i - n  -  o.2&2sQ
where
-  ( a 2SS0<53 ) R + (1 - a 26Q/R)CG
(41)
r* = a l  + V o  S/R _  V o  + *2
1 + s
(42)
This expression does not show directly the effect of labour supply (or the real wage) on the 




























































































tax rate through the production function, and this represents the link to output. Our 
diagrammatic analysis takes the tax rate, S, as parametric and thereby implicitly considers a 
situation in which a relatively elastic labour supply keeps the real wage relatively constant.
The numerator in (41) as well as expressions 
r  in (42) depend only on the target (H, H°) 
and instrument (R,S) variables and the 
exogenous level of public spending. For r <
1, i.e. for propensities to consume (a1( a2) 
not excessively high, and with S0 not too high 
(St small), the locus (an) is upwards sloping 
in r as can be seen in Figure 2. Any change 
which leads to higher taxation moves the 
locus rightward to ( b ' b ' ) .
A reduction in world demand (Ff 
falls) may be analyzed indirectly through the 
effect on taxation: with exports falling, the 
foreign asset position will remain unchanged only when taxes rise to cut demand and associated 
imports. Expression r  falls (as 3T/dS < 0 for reasonable parameter values) and this leads to 
lower output values for each level of competitiveness. The shift from an asymmetric supply 
shock which raises import prices (Pu) and ratio p is somewhat ambiguous. As ratio u rises, 
corresponding values for output rise and this tends to shift the locus (bb)  upwards to (b"b"). 
However this is mitigated by the rise in taxes which reduces expression r  and pushes the locus 
rightwards.
Combining figures 1 and 2 we can now study the combined effects that shocks have on 
output and competitiveness.8 Neither of these show the multiple solutions identified by Pagano 
(1990). The reason for this is that we have assumed that the labour supply responds elastically 
to the real wage, and that the labour supply schedule therefore intersects the labour demand 
schedule only once.
When world demand (Y8) falls both loci shift downwards and gross output is adjusted
Figure 2 The Production Constraint
Output and Competitiveness
8 The assumption that there is a rising labour supply curve does not seem to change the 
nature of this adjustment. Alogoskoufis (1990) describes a similar process for an economy with 































































































to a lower level (Figure 3.) Competitiveness falls but not substantially (point B), due to the 
fact that prices are only revised upwards slightly as production becomes less competitive (mark­
ups rise).
Adjustment after a Shock to 
Foreign Demand
Figure 4 Adjustment after a Shock to
Raw Materials' Prices
The situation is different with a rise in raw materials’ prices, l Prices rise and nominal 
wages follow because wages are defined in real terms. Competitiveness deteriorates markedly 
and the economy is now stabilised at point C in Figure 4. Output is lower and the terms of 
trade, measured against the world price of finished goods (P f are more favourable. This 
favourable adjustment of the terms of trade is achieved by an increase in the output price as 
the response to the increase in the raw materials’ price, t" ,  and has as its corollary the 
worsening in competitiveness. Both of these effects are in agreement with the results obtained 
in the full-scale simulation of the model in Section 4.
3.3 Economies o f Scale
The importance of economies of scale can be investigated by studying the effect of a 
change in 7,+7, on the two loci which determine r and Y. It can be seen that the external 
constraint is independent of 7,+72. However the locus bb in figure 2 is affected through 




























































































7 -7a r  2 l 7
3(7i+7 ) (7 : +72) 2 1 + s
where, for brevity,





In normal circumstances, the coefficient on labour, 72 is larger than that on capital, i 2. It is also 
a normal property of the consumption function that at > R  (Blanchard, 1985), and indeed if 
this condition is not met, then property income will tend to accumulate faster than it is spent, 
creating an unstable feedback. S0 > 1, but, if, as is in practice the case, only a small amount 
of wealth is held as cash, it will be only slightly above 1. Unless the propensity to consume out 
of labour income, a, is close to 1, we may conclude that u,/(l+S) < 1, while there is little 
reason to doubt that aJ(R  + 02) > 1. In normal circumstances, therefore ar/37 > 0, so that 
increasing returns to scale (higher 7) shift the locus (bb) to the left and the economy is brought 
to a new steady-state with higher output. This happens because the demand for labour falls 
relatively little (see 30) and is substituted by capital with higher returns.
3.4 The number of firms and other variables
With variables G, Y and V  determined by the first seven equations of Group II, 
equations (II.8), (II.9) and (11.10) can now be used to find the steady-state values for the 
number of firms (N), and the policy variables S and R.
Keeping the same simplification as before that j63 = 1 and substituting G from (II.4) 
into (II.8) we obtain after some manipulation that the number of firms is given by the 
expression:
N + T'232ur
The number of firms rises when competitiveness increases as this raises output and profits. To 
find the effect that increasing returns have on the number of firms, we rewrite (44) as:
N
e V 1 - B2u t )
B2ut
1 -  B2ur
(45 )
from which aN/3 7, > 0 and aN/dT2 < 0.
A rising productivity of labour encourages new firms to enter production because this raises the 




























































































profits rise both because of higher output revenue and lower depreciation costs.
4. Simulation Properties of the Model
The dynamic properties of the model may be demonstrated by simulating different types 
of demand and supply shocks under the assumption of prespecified targets for the nominal 
exchange rate, total foreign wealth and foreign reserves. Without loss of generality we consider 
that these targets are set equal to their equilibrium levels before the shock. As the shocks 
impinge upon the economy, the authorities use fiscal and monetary policy, as well as foreign 
exchange intervention to achieve asymptotically desired levels for the target variables. We aim 
to find out how the overall outcome is sensitive to the presence of increasing returns to scale, 
as a way of indicating the practical importance of scale effects on the response of the economy 
to these shocks.
4.1 Policy Rules
Our policy rules could have been chosen on the basis of an explicit welfare function, 
the definition of which reflects the relative preoccupation of the government to achieve some 
targets more effectively than others. However, the merits of an optimisation exercise in a 
theoretical model are limited as results will be strongly influenced by the specification of 
preferences. We have chosen to investigate the situation prevailing in a fixed exchange rate 
situation, and this, in itself effectively pins down one of the policy instruments. Monetary policy 
(interest rate fixing and foreign exchange integgntion) has to be used to maintain the nominal 
exchange rate. In order to avoid stock instability (See Weale et al, 1990, Ch. 4) fiscal policy 
must then be set with reference to some wealth objective. We have taken the wealth target to 
be net external wealth, 33, on the grounds that this reflects a current preoccupation. We have 
therefore chosen simple monetary policy rules which are effective at keeping the nominal 
exchange rate near its target and a fiscal policy rule designed to bring net foreign wealth to 
zero. The following policy rules are found to be satisfactory:
(9 Fiscal Policy
AS, = -0.30 M3,, - 0.02(H,, - 33*) (46)
09 Monetary Policy i f c
AR, = -0.03 bJrf\ - 0.005(33°,., - 33°*) (47)
(iii) Official Intervention




























































































The above policy structure implies active use of fiscal policy whenever the external position of 
the country, represented here by total foreign wealth (H), is disturbed. When adverse shocks 
affect the external account, domestic demand will be cut in order to restrict imports and allow 
the gradual return of the trade deficit to the initial level. In our model the tax increase needed 
to reduce demand has the effect of adding to costs. With the nominal exchange rate fixed, this 
policy aggravates the depressing effect of the tax increase on output, but reduces its 
effectiveness as a means of dealing with balance of payments disequilibrium. The problem is 
aggravated further because wages are effectively set in real rather nominal terms. This enhances 
the cost-push nature of tax increases and further offsets the effects of the shock on the current 
account.’
4.2 Simulation Results
To illustrate the implications of economies of scale with the aforementioned assignment 
of targets and instruments, we simulated the model under the assumption of perfect foresight 
in stock-exchange and capital markets* 10. The valuation ratio (Q) is free to react to 
unanticipated changes but in the long run it returns to its equilibrium level of one. The 
exchange rate is freely-floating, although its movements are effectively constraint by official 
intervention (48). In the long run this also returns to the target level, here set equal to the 
initial steady-state.
The following permanent shocks are considered:
(a) A shock to foreign demand, represented by a fall in world demand (I*) by 5%.
(b) A supply shock, expressed as an increase in import prices (Pu) by 5%.
Results of some key variables of the model are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 for various time 
periods. To identify the importance of the returns to scale we also present the values of the 
same variables when the same shock is applied but production is characterised by constant 
returns i.e. we set 7j = 0.7425 and 72 = 0.3575 so that 7, + 72 = 1 rather than 1.1 but l t/ l 2 
is unchanged.
4.3 A Shock to Foreign Demand
Let us first examine the effects and the policy response to a fall in world trade. Exports
5 Of course, if these offsetting effects were strong enough, the policy would not work. But 
with our parameter values they do no more than impede the working of the policy.
10 The solution technique was based on full-period iterations, and was similar in approach 




























































































fall immediately and output is reduced initially by about 1%. As the trade deficit starts 
widening, the current balance deteriorates and total foreign wealth is reduced. The rise in 
payroll taxation pushes prices up; wages follow in order to keep real wages constant and as a 
consequence demand for labour and output will fall even further in the short run. Because 
private agents foresee future reductions in profits , the valuation ratio falls immediately by 
1.50% and this causes a reduction in investment because, in the face of lower demand, some 
firms withdraw from the market. Investment only recovers somewhat as the valuation ratio starts 
to rise back towards its equilibrium value. Production recovers from the worst of the depression 
and by the end of the solution period output and employment have reached a level which is 
around 5% below the initial steady-state. The nominal exchange rate is kept close to its target 
value; H  and P f  are also kept reasonably close to their desired values.
From Table 4.1, one can see that the results are essentially the same with constant 
returns, confirming the observations made in section 3. It is only employment which will now 
be further reduced to 5.40% below the initial steady-state instead of 4.9% under increasing 
returns. Since both 7! and 72 have been reduced in equal proportions, the percentage change 
in output is the similar in each case in the long run. Equation (30) then suggests that the lower 
level of employment in the second case should be attributed to higher taxes. The simulation 
results confirm this view. In fact the tax rate rises markedly in the short run but later oscillates 
around modest levels above the base values. Prices change little, and this keeps competitiveness 
very close to the steady-state level (table 4.2).
4.4 A Shock to Import Prices
A similar recession is observed when the price of imports rises. The channel, though, 
is different because the primary effect now is the immediate rise of production cost that prices 
domestic producers out of foreign markets when we assume that the price of the foreign 
producers (PF) is not affected. Exports fall and the deteriorating trade deficit triggers a fiscal 
restraint as strong as in the previous case. At the end of the simulation period output and 
employment fall by over 4%, and this figure is again larger for employment under constant 
returns to scale. In this case prices rise more substantially (over 4%) and, as noted in section 
3.2, this causes a more serious deterioration in competitiveness.
What is remarkable in both simulations is the strong recession that is observed. This 
is a consequence of the slightly rising labour supply curve, which means that any situation which 
requires a lower real wage must be associated with a permanent reduction in output. Although 
the magnitude of the above phenomena should only be taken as indicative because of the 




























































































conclusions elaborated by Bruno and Sachs (1985, Ch.7) in a simulation model.
Table 4.1 A Fall in Foreign Demand (>*) by 5%
Period 1 9 16 75
Output y a -1.07 -6.98 -5.37 -4.98
b -1.10 -6.50 -5.09 -4.94
Gross Dom. Product G a -1.05 -6.43 -5.24 -4.83
b -1.10 -6.24 -5.16 -4.86
Capital K a 0.0 -0.71 -1.32 -3.35
b 0.0 -0.73 -1.32 -3.49
Employment L a -1.11 -8.82 -6.34 -4.92
b -1.27 -9.03 -6.59 -5.43
Prices P a -0.04 4.69 1.02 1.19
b -0.07 2.10 -0.55 0.62
Wages W a 0.0 5.09 0.58 0.73
b 0.0 2.75 -1.25 0.06
Valuation ratio Q a -1.5 -5.36 -1.28 -0.04
b -1.87 -3.70 -0.16 -0.02
Interest rate R a 0.0 0.60 0.54 -0.29
b 0.0 0.48 0.46 -0.17
Tax rate S a 0.0 9.08 6.39 1.80
b 0.0 6.22 7.61 3.88
Exchange rate E a 0.20 0.34 0.15 0.0
b 0.10 0.20 0.07 0.0
Total foreign H a -0.49 0.35 0.08 0.04
Assets b -0.49 0.31 -0.04 0.02
Foreign Exchange P f a 0.10 0.08 0.06 -0.01
Reserves b 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.0
Note: Ail figures show percentage deviations from the steady state, except that, for H  and H°, 
deviations are measured as a percentage of base period GDP. a shows the result with increasing 




























































































Tabic 4.2 A Rise in Import Prices ( f )  by 5%
Period 1 9 16 75
Output Y a -0.39 -6.55 -5.12 -4.51
b -0.40 -6.25 -4.98 -4.53
Gross Dom. Product G a -1.55 -6.49 -5.63 -5.23
b -1.53 -6.47 -5.57 -5.16
Capital K a 0.0 -0.83 -1.51 -3.71
b 0.0 -0.86 -1.52 -3.84
Employment L a -0.38 -8.40 -6.04 -4.18
b -0.44 -8.87 -6.46 -4.70
Prices P a 0.66 10.52 6.03 4.40
b 0.65 7.71 4.35 3.94
Wages W a 0.0 11.12 5.83 3.97
b 0.0 8.69 3.74 3.46
Valuation ratio Q a 0.32 -7.26 -2.90 -0.04
b -0.42 -6.09 -1.99 -0.04
Interest rate R a 0.0 0.63 0.48 -0.30
b 0.0 0.60 0.49 -0.27
Tax rate S a 0.0 10.18 5.52 -1.71
b 0.0 6.66 7.74 0.04
Exchange rate E a 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.0
b 0.14 0.30 0.13 0.0
Total foreign Assets H a -0.89 0.44 0.21 0.04
b -0.89 0.44 0.08 0.04
Foreign Exchange a 0.10 0.12 0.09 -0.02
Reserves b 0.07 0.08 0.06 -0.01
Note: All figures show percentage deviations from the steady state, except that, for H  and 
deviations are measured as a percentage of base period GDP. a shows the result with increasing 





























































































The use of a simulation framework allows the construction of a model in which no 
important feedback has been neglected. Our model has, in particular, provided a novel modelling 
of the mark-up based on a simple structure of imperfect competition. However the simulation 
model should be developed in a number of ways.
First, the introduction of a consumption function such as that described by Blanchard (1985) 
would allow the study of forward-looking consumption behaviour. Secondly, the extension of the 
model to a multi-country framework would allow a detailed study of the effects of policy co­
operation. In particular it would allow investigation of whether the greater gains arise from co­
operation between similar countries or countries which differ in important factors such as labour 
market structure, and in the economies of scale.
However, our most important, and perhaps rather suiprising conclusion is that our policy 
structure appears extremely robust to the variation in supply conditions represented by the degree 
of economies of scale. This leads us to infer that, while the presence of economies of scale may 
have a major impact on the desirability of some types of policy changes, it does not affect very 
much the working of a simple stabilization policy in the presence of a fixed nominal exchange rate.
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